plication functions as the disavowal of the antagonism that inheres to the notion of modernity as such; the falsity of multiplication resides in the fact that it frees the universal notion of modernity of its antagonism, of the way it is embedded in the capitalist system, by relegating this aspect just to one of its historical subspecies. And, insofar as this inherent antagonism could be designated as a "castrative" dimension and, furthermore, insofar as, according to Freud, the disavowal of castration is represented as the multiplication of the phallus representatives (a multitude of phalluses signals castration, the lack of the one), it is easy to conceive such a multiplication of modernities as a form of fetishist disavowal. This logic holds also for other ideological notions, especially, today, for democracy. Those who want to distinguish another ("radical") democracy from its existing form and thereby cut off its links with capitalism commit the same categorical mistake.
At this point, one should introduce the difference between the works of Deleuze himself and the popular field of Deleuzianism: which of the two is the true target of our critique? The latter, because it goes without saying that Deleuze's thought is ridiculously simplified in its popular acceptance, so that it is easy to say that things are so much more complex in Deleuze; however, if there is something to be learned from the history of thought, from Christianity to Marx and Heidegger, it is that the roots of misappropriations are to be sought in the original thinker himself.
Microfascisms
The inverted mirror image or counterpart of this ambiguity of the Deleuzian attitude towards capitalism is the ambiguity of Deleuze's theory of fascism, a theory whose basic insight is that fascism does not take hold of subjects at the level of ideology, interests, and so on but directly at the level of bodily investments, libidinal gestures, and so on. Fascism enacts a certain assemblage of bodies, so one should fight it (also) at this level, with impersonal counterstrategies. At the same time, there is the opposition of micro and macro, molecular and molar. Fascism is a life-denying view, a view of renunciation, of the sacrificial subordination to Higher Goals; it relies on impersonal microstrategies, manipulations of intensities, which work as life-denying. Here, however, things get complicated. The fascist renunciation in the best Deleuzian way is a deceiving mask, a lure to distract us from the positivity of fascism's actual ideological functioning, which is one of superego obscene enjoyment. In short, fascism here is playing the old hypocritical game ofa fake sacrifice, of the superficial renunciation ofenjoyment destined to deceive the big Other, to conceal from it the fact that we do enjoy and enjoy even excessively. "God demands constant enjoyment, as the nor- Deleuze's account of fascism is that, although subjects as individuals can rationally perceive that it is against their interests to follow it, it seizes them precisely at the impersonal level of pure intensities: "abstract" bodily motions, libidinally invested collective rhythmic movements, affects of hatred and passion that cannot be attributed to any determinate individual. The impersonal level of pure affects sustains fascism, not the level of represented and constituted reality. The Sound of Music is the ultimate example. Its "official" story line is antifacist, but its texture of intensities generates the opposite message. That is to say, the Austrians resisting the Nazi invasion are presented as "good fascists" (displaying their rootedness in the local patriarchal lifeworld, enjoying the stupidity of the yodelling culture, and so on), while the film's portrait of the Nazis uncannily echoes the Nazi portrait of the Jews, uprooted political manipulators striving for global power. The struggle against fascism should be fought at this impersonal level of intensities-not (only) at the level of rational critique-by undermining the fascist libidinal economy with a more radical one. However, productive as this Deleuzian approach is, it is time to problematize it and, with it, the general tendency, popular among (especially Western Slavoj Zizek / The Ongoing "Soft Revolution" a catch-all, an all-encompassing term for everything that opposes the free flow of Becoming; it is inseparable from a proliferation of molecular focuses in interaction, which skip from point to point, before beginning to resonate together in the National Socialist State. Rural fascism and city or neighborhood fascism, youth fascism and war veteran's fascism, fascism of the Left and fascism of the Right, fascism of the couple, family, school, and office.7
One is almost tempted to add: and the fascism of the irrationalist vitalism of Deleuze himself (in an early polemic, Alain Badiou effectively accused Deleuze of harboring fascist tendencies!). Deleuze and Guattari (especially Guattari) often indulge here in a true interpretive delirium of hasty generalizations; in one great arc, they draw a continuous line from the early Christian procedure of confessions through the self-probing of romantic subjectivity and the psychoanalytic treatment (confessing one's secret, perverse desires) up to the forced confessions of the Stalinist show trials (Guattari once directly characterized these trials as an exercise in collective psychoanalysis). To such analyses, one is tempted to respond by pointing out how the Stalinist trials were evidently productive; their actual goal was not to discover the truth, but to create new truth, to construct or generate it. It is here, against such generalizations, that one should evoke the lesson of Laclau's notion of hegemonic articulation: fascism emerges only when disparate elements start to resonate together. In fact, it is only a specific mode of this resonance of elements (elements that can also be inserted into totally different hegemonic chains of articulation).8 At this precise point, one should also emphasize the problematic nature of Deleuze's sympathy for Wilhelm Reich.9 Reich's thesis on the nuclear bourgeois family as the elementary cell generating the fascist authoritarian personality is blatantly wrong (demonstrated previously by the analyses of Adorno and Horkheimer in the 1930s).
And Stalinism?
The further problem here is that, following a long leftist tradition, Deleuze and Guattari avoid confronting the specificity of Stalinism, dismissing (1928) (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) , became "a sort of monster that seemed to be swallowing the small independent writers' organizations one by one."'5 This is why the elevation of Socialist Realism into the "official" doctrine was greeted by the majority of writers with a sigh of relief; it was perceived (and also intended) as the defeat of proletarian sectarianism, as the assertion of the right of writers to refer to the large corpus of the progressive figures of the past, and of the primacy of wide humanism over class sectarianism. worker, even an explanatory note on a historical event that took place hundreds of years ago. The message to be deciphered from such signals was mostly quantitative; it concerned the level of pure intensities more than concrete content: speed up or slow down the pace of collectivization, and so on. These signals were of two basic types: the main type was the "hardline" signal to proceed faster, to crush the enemy more mercilessly, even if one violates the existing laws. Say, in the big radicalization of the policy towards the Orthodox church at the end of the 1920s, the signal enjoined the mass closings and destruction of the churches and the arrests of priests, acts that countered the explicit existing laws (such instructions were issued to local party organizations, but treated as a secret not to be published). The profit from such a modus operandi is obvious; because these signals were never explicitly stated, they were much easier to repudiate or reinterpret than explicit policy statements. The complementary opposite signal pointed in the direction of relaxation and tolerance, as a rule attributed to Stalin himself, putting the blame for the "excesses" on the lower-level officials who did not understand Stalin's policy. Such a signal was also issued in an informal way, say, Stalin personally phoning Boris Pasternak, asking him with feigned surprise why he had not recently published a book; the news circulated quickly on the intelligentsia grapevine. The ambiguity was thus total: a local official, confronted by a general unspecified order, was caught in the unsolvable dilemma of how to avoid being accused of leniency, but also how to avoid being scapegoated as responsible for the "excesses." However, one should not forget that the deadlock of the party leadership emitting these signals was no less debilitating; with total power in their hands, they were not even able to issue explicit orders about what was to be done.
Netocracy?
The further paradox with regard to Stalinism is that the "procapitalist" The problem of Netocracy is that it moves simultaneously too fast and not fast enough. As such, it shares the mistake of all those other attempts that much too quickly elevated a new entity into the successor of capitalism (an entity stuck at the same level as capitalism): the postindustrial society, the informational society. Against such temptations, one should insist that the "informational society" is simply not a concept at the same level as feudalism or capitalism. The picture of the accomplished rule of the netocracy is therefore, in spite of the authors' stress on new class antagonisms, a utopia: an inconsistent composite that cannot survive and reproduce itself on its own terms. All too many of the features of the new netocratic class are only sustainable within a capitalist regime. Therein resides the weakness of Netocracy; following the elementary logic of ideological mystification, it dismisses as remainders of the (capitalist and statist) past what are, effectively, positive conditions of the functioning of the informational society.
The key problem is the way netocracy relates to capitalism. On the one side, we have patents, copyrights, and so on-all the different modalities in which information itself is offered and sold on the market as intellectual property, as another commodity. And, when the authors claim that the true elite of netocracy is beyond patents and so on because its privilege is no longer based on possessing the information, but on being able to discern, in the confusingly massive quantity of information, the relevant material, they strangely miss the point. Why should this ability to discern what really matters, the ability to discard the irrelevant ballast, not be another-perhaps crucial-piece of information to be sold? In other words, they seem to forget here the basic lesson of today's cognitive sciences: already, at the Slavoj ifek / The Ongoing "Soft Revolution" giving its tone to the totality--not quantitatively, but playing the key, emblematic structural role. This, then, far from posing a mortal threat to democracy (as conservative cultural critics want us to believe), opens up a unique chance of "absolute democracy." Why?
In immaterial production, the products are no longer material objects, but new social (interpersonal) relations themselves. Marx emphasized how material production is always also the (re)production of the social relations within which it occurs; with today's capitalism, however, the production of social relations is the immediate goal of production. Hardt and Negri wager that this directly socialized, immaterial production not only renders owners progressively superfluous (who needs them when production is directly social, formally and as to its content?); the producers also master the regulation of social space because social relations (politics) is the stuff of their work. The way is thus open for "absolute democracy," for the producers directly regulating their social relations without even the detour of democratic representation.
The problem here is, at a minimum, triple. First, can one really interpret this move towards the hegemonic role of immaterial labor as the move from production to communication to social interaction (that is, in Aristotelian terms, from techne as poiesis to praxis, namely, as the overcoming of the Arendtian distinction between production and vis activa, or of the Habermasian distinction between instrumental and communicational reason)? Second, how does this "politicization" of production, where production directly produces (new) social relations, affect the very notion of politics? Is such an "administration of people" (subordinated to the logic of profit) still politics, or is it the most radical sort of depoliticization, the entry into "postpolitics"? And, last but not least, is democracy by necessity, with regard to its very notion, nonabsolute? There is no democracy without a hidden, presupposed elitism. Democracy is, by definition, not global; it has to be based on values or truths that one cannot select democratically. In democracy, one can fight for truth, but not decide what truth is. As Claude Lefort and others amply demonstrated, democracy is never simply representative in the sense of adequately expressing a preexisting set of interests, opinions, and so on because these interests and opinions are constituted only through such representation. In other words, the democratic articulation of an interest is always minimally performative; through their democratic representatives, people establish what their interests and opinions are. As Hegel already knew, "absolute democracy" could only actualize itself in the guise of its "oppositional determination," as terror. There is, thus, a choice to be made here: do we accept democracy's structural, not just accidental, imperfection, or do we also endorse its terroristic dimension?
Hardt and Negri's slogan-multitude as the site of resistance against the Empire-opens up a further series of problems, the primary one among them being the loss of the radical ambiguity of this term in Spinoza, from whom it is taken. When Spinoza describes how a multitude is formed through imitatio affecti, the mechanisms he evokes are thoroughly neutral with regard to their good or bad effects. Spinoza thus avoids both traps of the standard approach; he neither dismisses the mechanism that constitutes a multitude as the source of the irrational destructive mob, nor does he celebrate it as the source of altruistic self-overcoming and solidarity. Of course, he was deeply and painfully aware of the destructive potential of the multitude; recall the big political trauma of his life, the lynching of the de Witt brothers, his political allies. However, he was aware that the noblest collective acts are generated by exactly the same mechanism-in short, democracy and a lynch mob have the same source. The concept of multitude qua crowd is fundamentally ambiguous; multitude is resistance to the imposing One, but, at the same time, it designates what we call mob, a wild, irrational explosion of violence that, through imitatio affecti, feeds on and propels itself. This profound insight of Spinoza gets lost in today's ideology of multitude: the thorough "undecidability" of the crowd. Crowd designates a certain mechanism that engenders social links, and this very same mechanism that supports, say, the enthusiastic formation of social solidarity also supports the explosive spread of racist violence.
Furthermore, the question arises concerning the level at which a multitude functions-what a given field of multitudes excludes, what it has to exclude in order to function. There is, hence, always a nonmultiple excess beyond the multitude. Take multiculturalist identity politics-a thriving multitude of identities (religious, ethnic, sexual, cultural) asserted against the specter of antiquated class reductionism and essentialism. As it was noted long ago by many a perspicuous observer, in the mantra of class, gender, and race, class sticks out, never properly thematized. Another case of such a homogenization of multitudes is capital itself; capitalism is multiplicity in principle (totally monopolistic capital is conceptual nonsense), but, precisely as such, it needs a universal medium as the sole domain within which its multitude can thrive, the medium of a legally regulated market where contracts are respected and their breach punished, and so on. In what I would call a properly dialectical move, Ernesto Laclau points out how "it was only when the process of centralization in early modernity had advanced beyond a certain point that something resembling a unitary multitude 
standing for the interests of immigrants, advocating global mobility). It is, effectively, today's opposition to global capital that seems to provide a kind of negative mirror image in relation to Deleuze's claim about the inherently antagonistic nature of capitalist dynamics (a strong machine of deterritorialization that generates new modes of reterritorialization).
Today's resistance to capitalism reproduces the same antagonism. Calls for the defense of particular (cultural, ethnic) identities being threatened by global dynamics coexist with the demands for more global mobility (against the new barriers imposed by capitalism, which concern, above all, the free movement of individuals). Is it, then, true that these tendencies (these lignes defuite, as Deleuze would have put it) can coexist in a nonantagonistic way, as parts of the same global network of resistance? One is tempted to answer this claim by applying to it Laclau's notion of the chain of equivalences: this logic of multitude functions because we are still dealing with resistance. However, what happens when-if this really is the desire and will of these movements-we take it over? What would the multitude in power look like?
There was a similar constellation in the last years of really existing socialism: the nonantagonistic coexistence, within the oppositional field, of a multitude of ideologico-political tendencies, from liberal human-rights groups to "liberal" business-oriented groups, conservative religious groups, and leftist workers' demands. This multitude functioned well, as long as it was united in the opposition to "them," the Party hegemony. Once they found themselves in power, the game was over. Another case of acting multitude is the crowd that brought Hugo Chavez back into power in Venezuela. However, can we forget the obvious fact that Chavez functions as a Latin-
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American caudillo, the unique leader whose function is to magically resolve the conflicting interests of those who support him? "Multitude in power" thus necessarily actualizes itself in the guise of an authoritarian leader whose charisma can serve as the empty signifier able to contain a multitude of interests (Juan Per6n was a militaristic patriot to the Army, a devout Christian to the church, a supporter of the poor against oligarchy on behalf of workers, and so on). The favored example of the supporters (and practitioners) of the new, dispersed counterpower of the multitude is, of course, the Zapatista movement in Chiapas. Here is Klein's description of how its leading figure, subcommandante Marcos, functions:
He wasn't a commander barking orders, but a subcomandante, a conduit for the will of the councils. His first words, in his new persona, were "Through me speaks the will of the Zapatista National Liberation Army." Further subjugating himself, Marcos says to those who seek him out that he is not a leader, but that his black mask is a mirror, reflecting each of their own struggles; that a Zapatista is anyone anywhere fighting The way that a concept like hope can be made useful is when it is not connected to an expected success-when it starts to be something different from optimism-because when you start trying to think ahead into the future from the present point, rationally there really isn't much room for hope. Globally it's a very pessimistic affair, with economic inequalities increasing in many regions, with the global effects of environmental deterioration already being felt, with conflicts among nations and peoples apparently only getting more intractable, leading to mass displacements of workers and refugees ... it seems such a mess that I think it can be paralysing. ... On the other hand, if hope is separated from concepts of optimism and pessimism, from a wishful projection of success or even some kind of rational calculation of outcomes, then I think it starts to be interesting-because it places it in the present. 24 Thus, one should bear in mind the radical ambiguity of this position. The suspension of the teleological dimension, the immersion into the now, the fact that the process of liberation already has to practice freedom, all this remains tainted by the suspicion that the focus on the now is a desperate strategic retreat from the hopelessness of any approach based on the more global cognitive mapping of the situation.
The Liberal Fake What makes the situation appear so hopeless is not only the "objective" socioeconomic constellation but, even more, the hegemony of the liberal-24. Massumi, "Navigating Movements," p. 211. democratic ideology that necessitates a break (with democracy as the master signifier) that few are ready to risk. Yet this break-the break with the liberal fake-is of the foremost urgency today.
Perhaps the best indicator of the liberal fake is the sincere horror expressed by liberals apropos overt racist excesses. Recall the well-known (true) story, retold again and again, of how, a century ago, the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court defined as "negro" anyone with even a minimum of African American blood-one sixty-fourth of your ancestry was enough, even if you looked white. What is wrong with the passionate retelling of such stories, which is usually accompanied by exclamations like, "You see, this was even worse than the Nazis, for whom you were counted as Jewish only if one-eighth or more of your ancestry was Jewish!"? The very focus on the excess automatically renders acceptable a more "moderate" form of the racist exclusion-say, "only" one-quarter or one-third ofAfrican American blood. In other words, the role of such excesses, the moral indignation they give rise to, is exactly the same as today's indignation felt by good liberal democrats when they are confronted with violent, overtly racist populismafter shouting "Horrible! How dark and uncivilized! Wholly unacceptable! A threat to our basic democratic values!" they, of course, proceed to do the same thing in a more "civilized" way-the familiar reasoning that goes something like, "But the racist populists are manipulating the legitimate worries of ordinary people, so we do indeed have to take some measures!" Therein resides the true problem with politicians like Le Pen in France. A close look at how Le Pen made it into the second round of the French presidential elections of 2002 renders clear the true stakes of the widespread emotion of fear and shame, panic even, that Le Pen's first-round success generated among many a democratic leftist. The cause of panic was not Le Pen's percentage as such but the fact that he finished second among the candidates, instead of Jospin, the "logical" candidate for this place. The panic was triggered by the fact that, in the democratic imaginary of the multiparty states in which the political field is bipolar, with the two big parties or blocks exchanging power, the second place symbolically signals the electability of a candidate. This is what disturbed the silent pact of today's liberal democracies, which allow political freedom to everyone-on condition that a set of implicit rules clearly limits the scope of those who can effectively be elected.
So, then, is Le Pen unfit to be elected simply because he is heterogeneous to the liberal-democratic order, a foreign body in it? There is more to this. The misfortune (and role) of Le Pen was to introduce certain topics (the foreign threat, the necessity to limit immigration, and so on) that were then silently taken over not only by the conservative parties but even by the de facto politics of the "socialist" governments. Today, the need to "regulate" Slavoj iiZek / The Ongoing "Soft Revolution" the status of immigrants is part of the mainstream consensus; as the story goes, Le Pen did address and exploit real problems that bother people. The shame apropos Le Pen was thus the shame that arises when the hypocritical masks are torn down and we are directly confronted with our true stance.
Facts like these give us a clear indication of what the Left has been doing in the last few decades: ruthlessly pursuing the path of giving way, of accommodating itself, of making the "necessary compromises" with the declared enemy (in the same way the church had to compromise on the essentials in order to redefine its role in modern secular society) by way of reconciling the opposites, that is, its own position with that of the declared opponent. It stands for socialism, but can fully endorse economic Thatcherism; it stands for science, but can fully endorse the rule of the multitude of opinions; it stands for true popular democracy, but can also play the game of politics as spectacle and electoral spin; it stands for principled fidelity, but can be totally pragmatic; it stands for the freedom of the press, but can flatter and get the support of Murdoch. In the early days of his rule, Tony Blair liked to paraphrase the famous joke from Monty Python's Life ofBrian ("All right, but apart from the sanitation, the medicine, education, wine, public order, irrigation, roads, the fresh-water system and public health, what have the Romans ever done for us?")25 in order to ironically disarm his critics: "They betrayed socialism. True, they brought more social security, they did a lot for health care and education, and so on, but, in spite of all that, they betrayed socialism." As it is clear today, it is, rather, the inverse which applies: "We remain socialists. True, we practice Thatcherism in economics, we made a deal with Murdoch, and so on, but, nonetheless, we remain socialists."
In alist in general because one should support a certain determinate royal house), the only way for the two to unite was under the banner ofthe "anonymous kingdom of the Republic"; the only way to be a royalist in general is to be a republican.26 And, mutatis mutandis, is not something similar going on today? As we all know, capital nowadays is split into two factions (traditional industrial capital and "postmodern" digital-informationalcapital), and the only way for the two factions to find a common denominator is under the banner of the anonymous capitalism of social democracy; today, the only way to be a capitalist in general is to be a (Third Way) social democrat. This is how the opposition Left-Right works now; it is the new Third Way Left which stands for the interests of capital as such, in its totality (that is, in relative independence from its particular factions), while today's Right, as a rule, advocates the interests of some particular section of capital in contrast to other sections-which is why, paradoxically, in order to win the majority it has to augment its electoral base by directly appealing to select parts of the working class as well. No wonder, then, we find in the modern Right parties explicit references to the interests of the working class (protectionist measures against cheap foreign labor and cheap imports, and so on).
However, condemning the postmodern Left for its accommodation is also wrong because one should ask the obvious hard question: What was, effectively, the alternative? If today's "postpolitics" is opportunistic pragmatism with no principles, then the predominant leftist reaction to it can be aptly characterized as principled opportunism: one simply sticks to old formulas (such as the welfare state) and calls them principles, dispensing with the detailed analysis of how the situation changed-and thus retaining one's position of Beautiful Soul. The inherent stupidity of the "principled" Left is clearly discernible in its standard reproach to any analysis that proposes a more complex picture of the situation, renouncing any simple prescriptions on how to act. "There is no clear political stance involved in your theory"-and this from people with no stance but their principled opportunism. Against such a stance, one should gather the courage to claim that the only way to effectively remain open to the revolutionary chance is to renounce easy calls to direct action, which necessarily involve us in an activity where things change so that the totality remains the same. Today's predicament is that, if we succumb to the urge of directly doing something (for example, engaging in the antiglobalist struggle, helping the poor), we will certainly and undoubtedly contribute to the reproduction of the exist- If the Left were to choose the "principled" attitude of fidelity to its old program, it would simply marginalize itself. The task is a much harder one: to rethink thoroughly the leftist project, beyond the alternative of accommodating new circumstances and sticking to the old attitude. Apropos of the disintegration of state socialism two decades ago, one should not forget that, at approximately the same time, the Western social democratic welfare state ideology was also dealt a crucial blow, that it also ceased to function as the imaginary able to arouse a collective passionate following. The notion that the time of the welfare state has passed is today a piece of commonly accepted wisdom. What these two defeated ideologies shared is the notion that humanity as a collective subject has the capacity to somehow limit impersonal and anonymous sociohistoric development, to steer it in a desired direction. Today, such a notion is quickly dismissed as ideological or totalitarian; the social process is again perceived as dominated by an anonymous Fate beyond social control. 
How to Live with Catastrophes
Nowhere is today's resistance to the political act proper more palpable than in the obsession with catastrophe, the negative of the act. It is as if the supreme good today is that nothing should really happen. We can imagine an act only in the guise of a catastrophic disturbance, of a traumatic explosion of Evil. Susan Neiman is right. September iith took so many leftist social critics by surprise because fascism was, for them, the last and seemingly final appearance of a directly transparent Evil.27 After 1945, they perfected a mode of reading that taught us to recognize Evil in the guise of its opposite: liberal democracy itself legitimizes social orders that generate genocides and slaughter; today, massive crimes result from anonymous bureaucratic logic (what Chomsky called the invisible back-room boys). However, with September iith, they suddenly encountered an Evil that fits the most naive Hollywood image: a secret organization of fanatics that fully intends and plans in detail a terrorist attack whose aim is to kill thousands of random civilian victims. It is as if Arendt's banality of evil was again inverted; if anything, the al-Qaeda suicide attackers were not in any sense banal, but effectively demoniac. So, it seemed to the leftist intellectuals that if they were to directly condemn these attacks they would somehow undo In a further elaboration, one is tempted to propose four modes of Evil that, yet again, form a kind of Greimasian semiotic square: the totalitarian idealist Evil, accomplished with the best intentions (revolutionary terror); the authoritarian Evil, whose aim is simple corruption and power (and not any higher goal); the terrorist fundamentalist Evil, bent on the ruthless infliction of massive damage, destined to cause fear and panic; and, the Arendtian banal Evil, accomplished by anonymous bureaucratic structures. However, the first thing to note here is that the Marquis de Sade, the epitome of modern Evil, fits none of these four modes; he is, today, attractive because, in his works, the evil characters are larger-than- 
